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Tobacco Regulation and Its Discontents: A Cautious View from 
Singapore 
Locknie Hsu* 
Abstract 
In this article, Locknie Hsu discusses the implications of the various legal claims being 
pursued in various fora in relation to plain packaging of tobacco products laws, especially 
in relation to Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’). The 
article proceeds as follows: (1) In Part 1, Hsu examines the current state of Singapore’s 
regulation of tobacco; (2) part 2 of the article then considers Singapore’s current 
investment treaty commitments and their likely compatibility with plain packaging 
legislation, were it to be introduced into Singapore; (3) finally, part 3 considers the 
lessons which Singapore can take away from the current proceedings in relation to plain 
packaging legislation. 
Introduction 
As a signatory to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (‘FCTC’), the 
Singapore Government takes a pro-active stance on the control of tobacco use. Mindful of 
the social costs of smoking,1 it has enacted strict laws that include a comprehensive ban on 
the advertising of tobacco products and the prohibition of smoking in most indoor venues. 
There are also strict point-of-sale and packaging requirements for tobacco products. At the 
same time, Singapore obviously cannot ignore the important developments over the last 
two years regarding actions taken against other FCTC signatories by tobacco enterprises. 
By now, disputes have arisen not only in investment arbitrations but also at the World 
Trade Organization. In Australia and Norway, litigation has also arisen in national and 
regional courts, while Australia and Uruguay are facing arbitrations under their bilateral 
investment treaties.2 Singapore, like other FCTC signatory states, is watching the litigation 
keenly, even though the challenged measures are not identical to Singapore’s laws and 
regulations. This is because the cases may yield important insight on matters such as the 
scope and effect of investment 
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treaty obligations, interpretative issues and the applicability of health-related exceptions, in 
relation to tobacco measures. 
Like Australia, Singapore is also participating in negotiations for the conclusion of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (‘TPP’). The TPP is expected to yield far-
reaching new obligations in various areas of trade. In a reply to a question in Parliament in 
January 2012, the Singapore Minister for Trade and Industry confirmed that Singapore is 
watching ‘closely’ the litigation commenced against Australia with respect to its plain 
packaging law.3 The Minister confirmed at the same time that it was ‘unlikely’ that 
tobacco would be excluded from the TPP negotiations, so that tobacco-related measures 
would likely be subject to liberalization as well as investment commitments under the 
proposed agreement. 
I. Tobacco Regulation in Singapore 
Singapore regulates the sale, marketing and use of tobacco using a wide range of 
legislative controls as well as non-legislative, social programmes. Legislative measures 
include the prohibition of advertising with respect to tobacco products, control of sale and 
packaging of such products, regulation of cigarette contents in the form of nicotine and tar 
yield levels,4 and control and limitation of premises where smoking is permitted.5 Excise 
duties are also imposed on tobacco products. Non-legislative initiatives include the 
National Tobacco Control Programme (also known as the ‘I Quit’ movement), and the 
youth-oriented ‘Live it Up without Lighting Up’ initiative.6 The Government has, 
however, thus far not accepted the notion of banning smoking for those born after 2000.7 
In addition, as of 2009, Singapore duty-paid cigarettes must be individually marked 
‘SDPC’ to deter the use of cigarettes subject to duty evasion.8 In addition, the requirement 
of incorporation of graphic health warnings already exists and new versions of these health 
warnings will be imposed with effect from March 2013, along with a new requirement 
against the use of misleading terms on the packaging of such products. Labeling 
requirements are found in the Tobacco (Control of Advertisements and Sale) Act (‘the 
Act’).9 Section 17A of the Act prohibits packaging and labeling by any means that are: 
false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about the 
characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions of the tobacco product. 
This provision was introduced by the Smoking (Control of Advertisements and Sale) 
(Amendment) Act (Act No. 17/2010) (‘the Amendment Act’). The wording of section 17A 
of the Act  S 17A refers to the Act, not the Amendment Act) mirrors, to some extent, the 
relevant provision of the FCTC. Art. 11(1) of the FCTC states: 
Each Party shall, within a period of three years after entry into force of this Convention for 
that Party, adopt and implement, in accordance with its national law, effective measures to 
ensure that:  
(a) tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco product by any 
means that are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression 
about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions, including any term, 
descriptor, trademark, figurative or any other sign that directly or indirectly creates the 
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false impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than other tobacco 
products. These may include terms such as ‘low tar’, ‘light’, ‘ultra-light’, or ‘mild’.’10 
With the passing of this legislation, the then Minister for Health considered that Singapore 
would be ‘the third country in the world to fulfill all the obligations on tobacco labeling ...’ 
(Speech by the Minister for Health stated in Parliament, 19 July 2010.) This appears to 
indicate that no other labeling requirements are being planned at this point. 
The FCTC is, however, accompanied by a set of Guidelines which suggest further 
possible measures to signatory states. It is these Guidelines that propose the use of 
measures such as plain packaging and other means of regulation. The legal status of the 
Guidelines is not entirely clear. In their Foreword, it is stated that the: 
guidelines are intended to help Parties to meet their obligations under the respective 
provisions of the Convention. They reflect the consolidated views of Parties on different 
aspects of implementation, their experiences and achievements, and the challenges faced. 
The guidelines also aim to reflect and promote best practices and standards that 
governments would benefit from in the treaty-implementation process.11  
On the one hand, it may be argued that these Guidelines form a ‘subsequent 
agreement’ as to the ‘application’ of the FCTC provisions under Art. 31(3)(a) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, since they were adopted by a 
Conference of the Parties. On the other hand, these Guidelines are couched in terms of 
‘guidelines’ and non-mandatory, exhortatory language (such as ‘Parties should…’) and, as 
the Foreword suggests, the Guidelines seek to promote implementation of the FCTC itself. 
It is therefore arguable that the Guidelines neither have treaty status nor mandate exact 
compliance with their terms. 
With respect to plain packaging, the Guidelines state, with respect to 
implementation of Art. 11 of the FCTC: 
Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colors, 
brand images or promotional information on packaging other than brand names and 
product names displayed in a standard color and font style (plain packaging). This may 
increase the noticeability and effectiveness of health warnings and messages, prevent the 
package from detracting attention from them, and address industry package design 
techniques that may suggest that some products are less harmful than others.12 (Italic 
emphasis added.) 
Singapore has not indicated that it will introduce such plain packaging, i.e. while there is a 
prohibition as to ‘advertising’, there are currently no general restrictions in the manner 
envisaged above, as to use of logos or colors on packaging, or to the colors and font styles 
of brand and product names, all of which may form components of registered trademarks. 
In relation to the compliance of section 17A with Singapore’s obligations under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property (‘TRIPS’)  and other 
international laws, the then Minister stated (in response to questions raised by another 
Member of Parliament): 
 
4	
	
	
	
	
	 From a public health perspective, misleading terms are just as misleading, even if they are 
part of a trademark. ...  Let me state clearly that we intend the new section 17A to affect 
trademarks if they contain misleading descriptors. We are not going to exempt them.  We 
are fully aware of our TRIPS and other international obligations and we have consulted the 
relevant legal authorities extensively on this point. The proposed section 17A is aligned 
closely to the FCTC and will not violate Singapore's international obligations. We are in 
good company:  the European Union prohibits misleading terms and descriptors even if 
they are a part of the trademarks or brand names.13 
It should be further noted that the entry into force of section 17A of the Act has been 
delayed, in order to provide time for compliance.14 
Based on these statements, Singapore appears to take the view that the 
requirements on misleading terms under section 17A – even if they impinge on the use of 
trademarks – are in compliance with its TRIPS and other international obligations. There 
are two ways tobacco companies may escape the effects of section 17A: by proving that 
the particular words in question are not false, misleading or erroneous in the manner 
described by the section; or by omitting those words – if they are present – when using 
their trade marks. 
In the former situation, it would be necessary for the companies to provide 
satisfactory evidence that a particular term is not misleading, which may be difficult to do. 
In the latter, the Singapore legislation does not prohibit the use of trademarks in 
packaging, as long as other statutory requirements (such as the mandatory graphic 
depictions) are complied with. It should be noted, too, that the Trade Marks Act  generally 
does not permit word marks that are purely descriptive (such as ‘mild’ or ‘light’), unless 
they are proven to have acquired a secondary meaning in connection with the goods in 
question.15 A registered trade mark is therefore usually not likely to contain such purely 
descriptive words alone; instead, a registered trade mark containing such a word or words 
is likely to contain another element, such as a brand name and/or a logo. On its face, 
section 17A does not set out to prohibit the use of any particular trade mark, but only such 
components that may fall within the criteria of the section. Hence, even if a registered trade 
mark contains a word such as ‘mild’ or ‘light’, the rest of the mark, e.g. a logo or brand 
name, may still be used. 
In addition, under section 7(4) of the Trade Marks Act,16 a trade mark shall not be 
registered if it is: 
(a) contrary to public policy or to morality; or 
(b) of such a nature as to deceive the public (for instance as to the nature, quality or 
geographical origin of the goods or service). (Italic emphasis added.) 
Further, under section 7(5), a trade mark shall not be registered ‘if or to the extent 
that its use is prohibited in Singapore by any written law or rule of law.’ Of particular 
relevance would be section 7(4)(b) above, which contains an overlapping objective with 
that in section 17A, regarding deceptiveness in a mark. It may be appropriate, therefore, to 
bear section 17A in mind when applying section 7(4) of the Trade Marks Act at the 
registration stage. 
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II. Singapore’s Investment Treaty Commitments 
Singapore, as a member of ASEAN, adheres to ASEAN trade arrangements and 
supports ASEAN initiatives on tobacco control.17 In addition, Singapore is party to a 
number of bilateral free trade agreements (‘FTAs’) and bilateral investment treaties 
(‘BITs’).18 These FTAs and BITs contain significant investment protection commitments, 
including obligations with respect to fair and equitable treatment and expropriation. 
Tobacco regulation measures – as with other government measures – may be challenged 
under such treaty provisions. This makes the scope of these treaty commitments, as well as 
any applicable exceptions, critical in determining the risks Singapore faces when 
introducing and implementing tobacco control measures. While it is not within the scope 
of this article to conduct a comprehensive and detailed study of all of Singapore’s 
investment commitments and available exceptions, the following discussion will provide a 
brief analysis of some key treaties and their exceptions (or lack thereof) to investment 
commitments. 
The Singapore practice with regard to general – and particularly, health-related – 
exceptions has been uneven, and there is no ‘model’ investment treaty that Singapore 
adheres to consistently. In the majority of Singapore’s BITs, health exceptions are not 
explicitly provided for in relation to investment commitments; a small number contain 
either a general exception with no reference to health-related measures, or a specific health 
exception. A small number contain exceptions covering only preferential treatment arising 
out of other regional arrangements and taxation measures (such as the Singapore-Belarus 
BIT and Singapore-United Kingdom BIT). In the ten bilateral FTAs that have been signed, 
general health exceptions are included and largely mirror the language of Art. XX(b) of 
GATT 1994. In these exceptions there is no explicit mention of tobacco products – just as 
is the case in the GATT provision. 
The Singapore-Vietnam, Singapore-Latvia, Singapore-Peru, Singapore-Poland and 
Singapore-Uzbekistan BITs are examples which each contain an explicit exception for 
prohibitions and restrictions ‘directed’ to the ‘protection of public health’.19 The 
Singapore-Jordan BIT contains a general exception resembling Art. XX(b) of GATT 
1994.20 The Singapore-Netherlands BIT contains a general exception in Art. IX, which 
does not refer explicitly to health-related measures, but generally permits ‘measures taken 
in the public interest and under due process of law’.21 The Singapore-EFTA FTA contains 
a health-related exception in its investment provisions.22 Notably, the Singapore-Indonesia 
and Singapore-Ukraine BITs do not include health exceptions.23 Indonesia was the 
complainant country in the WTO case, US – Cloves,24 while Ukraine is a complainant in 
the current dispute over Australia’s plain packaging law. 
In the case of the United States (‘US’)-Singapore FTA, while there is a health 
exception similar to that in Art. XX(b) of GATT 1994, this is explicitly limited to apply 
only to chapters 2 to 6 of the FTA,25 excluding chapter 15 on Investment. By contrast, the 
more recent FTA between Malaysia and Australia contains an explicit health exception 
applicable to and included in the Investment chapter itself.26 A regional investment 
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treaty that Singapore is party to, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA), signed by the ten ASEAN members, contains a specific health exception, in Art. 
17(1)(b). This provision, whose language largely mirrors that of Art. XX(b) of GATT 
1994, states as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Member States and 
their investors where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on investors of any 
other Member State and their investments, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member State of measures:  
… 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; …27 
The ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Korea investment agreements each contain an Art. XX-
like provision, from whose applicability, investment measures are not excluded.28 On the 
other hand, while Art. XX of GATT 1994 does not apply to the Investment chapter (i.e. 
chapter 11 of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand), Art. XIV of the GATS – which 
contains a health exception – is applicable to the Investment chapter.29 
The absence of a general exception provision in a treaty has been discussed in the 
WTO, but only in the context of the interpretation of Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The 
Appellate Body noted in US – Clove Cigarettes30 that, while the GATT 1994 contains a 
national treatment obligation in Art. III accompanied by the general exceptions in Art. XX, 
Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides for national treatment without an equivalent 
general exception provision in that agreement. This did not mean, however, that the TBT 
Agreement does not provide room for health-related regulatory measures; Art. 2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement allows WTO members to pursue ‘legitimate objectives’, including the 
protection of human health. The differences in treaty commitments and exceptions, as 
illustrated above, prevent any generalization as to the risk of tobacco-related challenges 
faced by Singapore. However, there is presently still an opportunity to shape the 
commitments and exceptions that Singapore will make under the TPP, which is likely to be 
one of the most ambitious and stringent FTAs to be signed.  
Despite various calls to exclude tobacco from the TPP negotiations,31 this presently 
appears to remain part of the negotiations. At the same time, tobacco enterprise lobbies 
continue to exert their influence on governments involved in these negotiations, such as 
the US.32 On the other hand, some US states are in favour of a carve-out from TPP for 
tobacco.33 In addition to these state measures, the US has federal legislation to control 
tobacco use and advertising.34 The US is the only TPP negotiating partner that is not also a 
signatory to the FCTC.35 
The negotiating position of a country such as the US is therefore complex, as it 
involves a number of conflicting interests. However, there are options available even to 
such governments. One important option that has been proposed is the inclusion of a clear 
health exception in the agreement, explicitly covering tobacco control measures.36 Such 
explicit mention would be consistent with the Office of United States Trade Representative 
(‘USTR’) negotiating proposal to ‘explicitly recognize the unique status of tobacco 
products from a health and regulatory perspective’.37 The USTR in fact stated (as at May 
2012): ‘The [TPP tobacco] proposal would include language in the ‘general exceptions’ 
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chapter that allows health authorities in TPP governments to adopt regulations that impose 
origin-neutral, science-based restrictions on specific tobacco products/classes in order to 
safeguard public health.’38 (Italic emphasis added.)  To this end, it is interesting to note 
that subsection 2(2) of the US’ Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
Public Law 111-31 [H.R.1256] states as follows: 
(2) A consensus exists within the scientific and medical communities that tobacco 
products are inherently dangerous and cause cancer, heart disease, and other serious 
adverse health effects.39 
This legislation – and its treatment of imported clove cigarettes – was the subject 
matter of a dispute initiated by Indonesia against the US at the WTO: US – Clove 
Cigarettes.40 It should be noted additionally that some FTAs signed by Singapore 
incorporate provisions of the TBT Agreement, such as the Singapore-Peru FTA.41 This 
means that provisions such as Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement (which was raised and 
applied in US – Clove Cigarettes to the US measures) also applies by incorporation to the 
parties of such an FTA, and may potentially lead to challenges separate from those under 
investment protection provisions. 
III. Awaiting	Lessons	from	Various	Fora	
Singapore has not announced any plans to enact legislation requiring plain packaging, 
so that an immediate threat of legal action such as that faced by Australia in the ‘plain 
packaging’ litigation is not present. However, as many of Singapore’s investment treaty 
obligations are not explicitly accompanied by a health exception (and indeed, in some 
cases, specifically exclude investment commitments from the scope of the exceptions), 
there exists a risk that Singapore’s tobacco control measures may still be challenged under 
broad treaty commitments whose boundaries are still being tested in international 
arbitrations elsewhere. These commitments include fair and equitable treatment and 
expropriation, which have in some cases been interpreted to encompass a wide range of 
government actions. 
Two key questions on which the pending arbitrations and WTO cases will provide 
useful guidance – even if only in the immediate context of the specific treaties they relate 
to – are: 
 To what extent will measures regulating the sale and marketing of tobacco 
products be successfully challenged under investment treaty obligations, 
particularly in light of other international obligations of a host State under the 
FCTC and under TRIPs?; and 
 To what extent would health exceptions apply to protect the regulatory power in 
this area? In particular will a health exception provide unlimited regulatory power 
in relation to Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPRs’) for tobacco products? 
A number of important arguments in defense of the Australian ‘plain packaging’ 
measures have already emerged, both from Australia itself and from intervening parties 
which include Attorneys-General from various states and the Cancer Council.42 In addition 
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to the above questions, Singapore will need to answer a more specific question at the 
national level, in cautious implementation of the FCTC: what further measures, if any, 
regarding sale and packaging of tobacco products, should and may be implemented? 
Conclusion 
While Singapore has not proceeded to introduce plain packaging as Australia has, 
there are important litigation issues from Australia’s – and Uruguay’s – experience that 
will offer valuable guidance and insight to Singapore. Three key aspects that are unclear at 
the moment are: (1) whether tobacco regulation which impinges on IPRs may be 
considered an unconstitutional ‘taking’ at the national level, or a breach of treaty 
obligations on takings or expropriations; (2) whether such regulation may violate other 
general treaty obligations, such as that of fair and equitable treatment; and (3) the extent to 
which tobacco regulation in the name of health may trump IPRs, where a health exception 
clearly exists in a bilateral treaty. A number of variables make any general rule difficult. 
Such variables include the nature and effect of the legislation or regulation in question, the 
relevant treaty’s terms, the existence (or non-existence) and applicability of a treaty health 
exception. Even the arbitrations against Uruguay and Australia can be expected to yield 
differences given these variables. The tribunal’s stance on interpretation and the relative 
weight of policy considerations will be other pertinent factors in determining the reasoning 
and outcomes of the disputes. In the WTO cases, the challenges have so far largely 
revolved around compliance under the TRIPS and TBT Agreements.43 Two likely 
arguments in these cases will be the insufficiency of scientific evidence linking tobacco 
packaging to a reduction in smoking and the right of WTO members to impose health 
regulations vis-à-vis tobacco products.44 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public 
Health is also likely to be material evidence to be considered in this regard. 
From a risk-reduction point of view, it is in Singapore’s immediate interest to 
support the inclusion of a health exception explicitly applicable to tobacco regulatory 
measures in the TPP. Such inclusion will ensure a measure of protection in the TPP itself, 
as well as ensuring that the precedential value of the TPP – which many believe it will 
have – will work in favour of future FTA negotiators (including those of Singapore) 
arguing in favour of such an exception. A second-best option would be to support a more 
general health exception applicable to, inter alia, investment commitments, even if it 
makes no explicit mention of tobacco. This is so even if Singapore does not presently 
propose additional labeling or packaging measures for tobacco products, whether in the 
nature of ‘plain packaging’ under the FCTC Guidelines, or otherwise. This is to preserve 
regulatory space in favour of health protection objectives as tobacco product 
manufacturers seek to increase sales and to circumvent existing rules by developing new 
products or ways of product promotion. 
As Singapore and other ASEAN neighbors continue in efforts to control the sale 
and marketing of tobacco products, law-makers will no doubt have to do so with a cautious 
eye on the unfolding litigation developments elsewhere in order to draw whatever lessons 
are available from decisions arising from them. At the same time, Singapore stands poised 
at the threshold of a new set of commitments being formulated under the TPP and the 
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treatment of tobacco there, once finalized, will no doubt be fruit for further study and 
comment. 
 
* Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University, lockniehsu@smu.edu.sg. 
1 See, for instance, the speech of the Minister for Health in Parliament on 9 January 2012, citing a 
2002 study on such annual social costs amounting to S$600m-800m. The Minister cited smoking 
prevalence as ‘recently been on a rising trend from a low of 12.6% in 2004 to 13.6% in 2007 and 
14.3 % in 2010’. For a list of FCTC signatories and the dates of effect in them, see WHO website: 
http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/index.html.  
2  See Case No 389/2011, British American Tobacco Australasia Limited and Ors v. The 
Commonwealth of Australia; and Case S 409/2011, JT International SA v. Commonwealth of 
Australia; and Case E-16/10, Philip Morris Norway AS v Staten v/Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 
EFTA Court Report, 12 September 2011, at:  
http://www.eftacourt.int/index.php/cases/philip_morris_norway_as_v_staten_v_helse_og_omsorgsd
epartementet1 and 
http://www.eftacourt.int/index.php/cases/philip_morris_norway_as_v_staten_v_helse_og_omsorgsd
epartementet/. Information on the Australia arbitration case can be found at: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationallaw/Pages/Investor-State-Arbitration---Tobacco-Plain-
Packaging.aspx, while information on the Uruguay arbitration, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, can be 
found at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID. 
3 Reply in Parliament, 9 January 2012. 
4 The Tobacco (Control of Advertisements and Sale)(Limits on Certain Substances) Regulation 2010 
(No s 479) sets out limits on permitted nicotine and tar yield levels. 
5 See the Smoking (Prohibition in Certain Places) Act, Cap 310. 
6 See the Singapore Health Promotion Board’s website on this module: 
http://www.hpb.gov.sg/HOPPortal/article?id=11296.  
7 In his reply to a Parliamentary question by the Minister for Health, April 2012, on the problems 
with the proposal, the Minister stated: ‘There are significant practical difficulties and risks in 
implementing and enforcing such a measure and it may not result in the desired reduction in 
smoking rates’. 
8  Section 17, Customs Regulations, RG2, G.N. No. S 261/1979, 2009 Rev. Ed.; text and other 
information available at the Singapore Customs website: 
http://www.customs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/E06D619A-8293-434D-8496-
F8E621A9A0E3/0/CustomsRegulations.pdf and 
http://www.customs.gov.sg/topNav/new/SDPC+Cigarette+Marking+Regulation.htm.  
9 Cap. 309, 2011 Ed. See also the Tobacco (Control of Advertisements and Sale) (Licensing of 
Importers, Wholesalers and Retailers) Regulations 2010 (No s 478). The key regulations setting out 
labeling requirements are the Tobacco (Control of Advertisements and Sale) (Labelling) 
Regulations, Reg 2, G.N. No. S 378/2003, 2004 Rev. Ed. These include requirements regarding 
word and graphic content for smoked and smokeless products. 
10 FCTC website, at: 
 http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=31. 
11 FCTC Guidelines, 2011, available at: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241501316_eng.pdf. 
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12 FCTC Guidelines, 2011, available at: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241501316_eng.pdf.  
13 More generally, in response to a question in Parliament on 19 July 2010 on the banning of new 
products, the then Minister for Health stated staunchly: ‘My approach is this.  I will be fair to the 
companies and, as I have said, keep an open mind.  But you know my priority.  My priority is the 
interest, the safety and the health of our people, not the financial health of the tobacco companies. 
On that point, I am clear.’ It is noteworthy that the United States  (‘US’), a TPP negotiating partner 
that has significant tobacco interests, has federal legislation aiming to control tobacco use by those 
under 18 which similarly prohibit ‘reduced harm’ marketing claims such as ‘light,’ ‘low,’ or ‘mild; 
see footnote 35, infra. 
14 The Smoking (Control of Advertisements and Sale of Tobacco) (Amendment) Act 
(Commencement) Notification 2010 excluded application from 1 Sep 2010 of sections 5(c), 8(b) 
and 12 of17/2010. Section 12 refers to the insertion of the new section 17A. Section 17A will enter 
into force in Singapore from March 2013. On the time given for compliance, the then Minister for 
Health stated in Parliament, 19 July 2010: ‘We did not choose 12 months arbitrarily but because we 
have done it before when we introduced the requirement that they must display the health warning 
graphics. We gave them 12 months and they were able to comply.’ 
15  Section 2(1) of the Trade Marks Act provides that a ‘trade mark’ means any sign capable of being 
represented graphically and which is capable of distinguishing goods or services dealt with or 
provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any 
other person’. (Italic emphasis added.) Section 7(1) provides, inter alia, that the following marks are 
to be refused registration: 
 ‘… (b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character; 
 (c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to 
designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of 
production of goods or of rendering of services, or other characteristics of goods or services;…’ 
(Italic emphasis added.) 
 See also Yomeishu Seizo Co Ltd and another v Sinma Medical Products (S) Pte Ltd
[1991] 1 SLR(R) 246, at paras. 19 and 22, and decision of the Singapore High Court in Tobacco 
Importers and Manufacturers Sdn Bhd v Registrar of Trade Marks [1974-1976] SLR(R) 460, 
affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeal in Tobacco Importers and Manufacturers Sdn Bhd v 
Registrar of Trade Marks [1974-1976]  SLR(R) 649. 
16   Cap. 332, 2005 Rev. Ed. 
17 For an overview of some initiatives in the ASEAN region, see Southeast Asia Tobacco Control 
Alliance (‘SEATCA’) report on ASEAN Tobacco Control, June 2012, available at: 
http://seatca.org/dmdocuments/ASEAN%20Tobacco%20Control%20Report%202012.pdf. 
18  For information on Singapore’s FTAs and BITs, see, respectively, http://www.fta.gov.sg and 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Pages/IGAs.aspx.  
19  See Art. 11 in all the following BIT texts:   
http://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/2785/doc/Vietnam.pdf, 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/2785/doc/latvia.pdf, 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/2785/doc/Peru-Sing.pdf, 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/2785/doc/Poland.pdf and 
http://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Documents/app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/2785/doc/Uzbekistan-
Sing.pdf.   
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